One piece episode 686 online dating

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one piece episode 686 online dating

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And unfortunately, that message will not get - it will not ever get out to most of the users of D-Link routers in the world.

All of our listeners now know and need to be concerned, unfortunately, whether their particular model of D-Link router is vulnerable. There is absolutely no reason to believe at the moment that it isn't because every D-Link router tested of eight have been, including current ones and especially old ones for which D-Link is never going to provide a firmware update.

So I think at this point we need to consider routers as a commodity which ages out of use for reason of the vendor no longer maintaining it.

And certainly in this case, I mean, as we said, routers are the attack target of the year, maybe of the decade, because they're all sitting on the Internet. They've got networks behind them that may have juicy tidbits on them. And even if not, facing outward, botnets are grabbing them up and using them for attacks and reflecting traffic and more. If you're a D-Link router user, certainly if you have any of the D-Link routers I mentioned and that are written in the show notes, there's nothing you can do, as far as I know, except make sure that nothing is exposed publicly.

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Apparently this does require a public server access for someone outside to get to your router. So if that could be turned off so that there's no WAN-side admin If you turn off the WAN. Presumably that will protect you. Unless there's a bug there, too. I mean, who knows; right? There was no mention of mitigation in anything that I found.

So I can't say one way or the other.

one piece episode 686 online dating

But I do think that at this point we have to take the position that an unsupported router, obviously one where there's known vulnerabilities the manufacturer has said they have no interest in fixing, even though it appears they could just fix it once and make the same firmware available, they just don't care.

So at that point you just have to say, okay, they're not that expensive. It's worth saying, you know, it's worth having a garage sale and sticking it out there on the table and say to your neighbor, well, good luck with this. I've got a new one. Here's a broken router.

And the hackers love it. Yeah, works great for everyone. So it really needs to be Drupal 7 and 8 have a problem. There were five problems. Two were critical, and three Drupal's own security team said were moderately critical. One of the two critical bugs is an injection vulnerability in the default Drupal email backend, which uses PHP's mail function, which is DefaultMailSystem:: When using this default mailer to send email, some variables were not being sanitized - get this - for shell arguments.

As is common, when untrusted input is not sanitized correctly, remote execution may result. And in this case it does. The second of the two remote code execution bugs exists in Drupal 8's Contextual Links module.

In Drupal these modules supply contextual links that allow privileged users to more easily perform tasks related to regions of the page, thus contextual, without having to navigate to the admin dashboard.

However, the Contextual Links module also doesn't sufficiently validate the requested contextual links, which allows an attacker to launch a remote code execution on those links. That is to say that the links themselves are to code in Drupal which assumes its own variables haven't been tampered with.

But you can tamper with them, use the same link target URLs, and execute your own code on that Drupal service. So then in addition to those two baddies, the Drupal security team acknowledged that there were three other moderately critical ones. They said users of any version of 7 should move to at least 7. And users of 8. And then they noted in their security advisory that minor versions of Drupal 8 prior to 8.

So sites running older versions should update to the above 8. And those older Drupals, 8. So if you're going to jump, it's probably worth jumping to 8. Just bite the bullet now so that you can continue to get coverage. So I hope any admins using Drupal are signed up for security updates and are going to take these problems seriously and get this fixed. I have to say, I mean, as Drupal users here, we love Drupal, and I've used Drupal since the beginning.

You know, it's easy to - any software can have bugs, and Drupal does a good job of keeping it up to date. And they always have said for years, don't use old versions.

  • One Piece Episode 686
  • Chapter 686

Keep it up to date. But sometimes the jump is huge. Sometimes it's a big discontinuity, as we mentioned before, between major versions. And in fact it's funny you should mention that. There does look like there's some things that they changed so that you do need to dig around in the code a bit. So it's not just a completely seamless jump. They're not happy with some of the functions that they have defined, and they had to change them.

They changed - yeah. So, yeah, that's always been the problem. And I just - people need to use type-safe languages and capture these problems at compile time, not run time. We know how to do that, you know? Declare all your variables and make sure you don't use them until you've declared them.

Things like that, yeah.

one piece episode 686 online dating

Gee, what a concept. Because a lot of this comes to referencing null pointers and things like that, and you can avoid that.

And a compiler should catch it anyway. I'll get off my high horse. So this is sort of mostly just a public service announcement for anyone who might be using and have a publicly available real-time streaming protocol RTSP media server. It contains, unfortunately, a critical remote execution bug. Boy, is this becoming a broken record.

Which affects versions prior, all versions prior to last Wednesday's release of 0. So that just happened on October 17th. And if you haven't updated, if you're using LIVE streaming media server to offer anything publicly, if it's just internal Intranet then you're okay, assuming you can trust all your internal users.

But there is a remote execution bug which would allow any publicly exposed version of this media streaming server to be taken over remotely. So anyway, I did not get a sense for how widely used it was. But again, it only takes one, if you're the one who uses it, and somebody's able to scan, find the server, and say, oh, thank you very much, we want to crawl inside your network through this little portal that you've created.

We don't use it, but I'm well aware of Live. They've been around for a long time. Yeah, Live Networks is like the real deal. Yeah, they're one of the biggies.

One Piece Episode 686 Subtitle Indonesia

The only thing I know, though, is I have a real-time streamer, Facebook streamer, that I bought the Mevo cam from them, which probably uses that protocol. Yeah, something to be aware of. So we're unable to stop talking about, for better or for worse, the Windows 10 October update.

The infamous Build has another problem. So as we know - the good news is it's still not rereleased yet. So they found this in some preview buildalso known as 19H1. I've not been tracking all this cryptic insider So is the one that was supposed to come out now, September Now you're talking aboutbasically, which is 19H1, the first half of So that's in the Insider - the Insiders are getting this now.

You know, there's something wrong with the process at Microsoft. This is actually getting to be problematic. And you know, Leo, we're looking for that new era of enhanced productivity. Was that what they were advertising? That's something, and the most secure version of Windows ever. I love that one. As we well remember. I've seen a number of articles recently saying the problem really is the way Microsoft does this, which is they've got a code base.

They do these short, like six-week sprints to add a feature. So they spend a long time thinking of the features. In six to eight weeks they create the feature. There's no testing at that point. They lay it into a testing version which they then test for a long period of time. This is how they did it when they did three-year-releases, but they're still doing this now for these biannual releases.

And it's not an effective testing process. They need a better way of testing before they get them into these beta releases. There may be a structural problem here. We'll talk about it tomorrow on Windows Weekly, I'm sure.

So as we know, when the content, those of us who are power Windows users and who understand zip files, when the content of a zip file extraction would cause the overwrite of an existing same named file within the archive, the user - I know, Leo.

Are you sitting down? The user should be prompted about the pending overwrite. That's right, a file naming collision, and asked whether to replace or skip the extraction of the colliding file. So the good news is this problem has been caught before, well, what I wrote - now I'm not sure.

So it's been caught before the full formal re-release of Build But it was reported as being in I assumed it was the pre-release people. So that means they fix it for the next generation. Yeah, well, they clearly have to fix it now. Fix it for both, yeah.

And I know that this is just - I'm kicking this dead horse one last time. But in some recent reporting over on Computer World I noted that Microsoft's forensic analysis revealed that as many as 1, instances of Build 's pre-release testers had their files deleted and complained without Microsoft noticing.

Microsoft said it was 0. What did you just say? Because a lot of people try these builds. This is a public build. And but a lot got bit. And Microsoft said, oh.

Yeah, that's a lot of people. We missed that one. Lot of people with bad [crosstalk]. Also I should just note that, after talking about this for the last few podcasts, in between then and now I updated the machine I'm talking to you on, Leo.

This camera that I'm looking at is running Windows It was running Windows 10 Home, which is what came preinstalled on the little Windows 10 box that I just grabbed, just a little turnkey box.

So I updated to Pro since I definitely decided that I want to begin hanging back from each month's security updates as well as the biannual "feature" update. There's nothing I need that much each month that's worth being bit like this. And I'd rather let them, you know, I think that the security release we would know within a week if it was causing problems.

So I've set that to give me two weeks. And I think I set it to 30 days for the feature update because we would know by then if it's something, if you really should put it off further.

So again, and as I mentioned, Windows 10 Home does not give you the option to delay, to defer these. You take them when they make them available. I hope that our listeners consider, after this painful set of October surprises, consider deferring, as I now have, I mean, so much so that I switched to the Pro version just so that I could have that feature.

It just seems wrong that Microsoft is being stingy about that. No, we're going to make you have Pro if you want to defer. It's like, my god, okay. So the most popular, second only to the jQuery platform itself, the most popular jQuery plugin, which has been around for 10 years, is vulnerable. This is the jQuery File Upload plugin which was released, like I think it was within a week, just like five days before the Apache team changed the way the.

As a consequence, the use of. Well, it turns out that 10 years ago, with Apache v2. I remember when this happened because I used. And also the problem is this left some developers - oh, and the other reason was the Apache people didn't want the local application of. Yeah, you just use sig file now. Attending that meeting was Akamai's Larry Cashdollar. That's actually his last name.

One Piece 684 - Luffy saves Trafalgar Law from Pica

What a great name. For a guy running a CDN. He expected the weather to be nice, so he failed to bring a raincoat, and it rained throughout the week. So Larry was hotel bound.

Episode 686

Having therefore nothing else to do - he couldn't walk around, sample the local fare - he decided to poke around at the various add-on packages available for Node. So I read into the story pretty far, as you can tell. I'll skip the details of how he arrived at what he found. So first of all, it's always been the case that allowing uploaded files to a server is extremely fraught, I mean, it's inherently fraught with danger.

This is not to say that it's not possible to do so safely. But few things should instill more fear in the heart of the responsible web designer than enabling file uploads. How many times have we here on this podcast covered buffer overrun exploits in image renderers? As we've said, interpreters are very difficult to get correct. Well, and even JavaScript, to be honest.

We had that problem. We were bit with malware. We had an old Drupal plugin that allowed somebody to hack our code.

And he was able to upload arbitrary code to an executable directory. And it was JavaScript. Or maybe it was, probably was PHP, come to think of it. But, yeah, I mean, [crosstalk] anything you want. So imagine that you're able to put anything you want anywhere, and then you invoke it from a URL outside And that's the problem with PHP. It's a URL-invokable protocol. So what we have here is much worse. Than even that, yes. Due to a presumably, as I mentioned, well-meaning change that the Apache group made back in Well, that's one of the ways they used.

To block a directory. So starting with that version of Apache, 2. This setting was made for security reasons, was enabled by default, which means, as I've often said, the tyranny of the default, enabled by default, and remained so for all subsequent Apache httpd server releases. So in the process this jQuery file upload, which is the most popular plugin, second only to the platform itself on GitHub, its assumption that it could protect its file uploads using a local.

So on GitHub this plugin says: Supports cross-domain, chunked, and resumable file uploads. Not surprisingly, lots of people use it. So our Larry Cashdollar says in his vulnerability disclosure: It also does not exclude file types.

This allows for remote code execution. The files are named upload. I wrote a quick command line test with curl, and a simple PHP shell file confirmed that I could upload a web shell and run commands on the server. And it's literally one line, and he used example. There are a" - get this - "a few YouTube videos demonstrating the attack Is there anything YouTube can't do?

So this is of extra concern because the jQuery File Upload bug is not some obscure widget. It is an extremely capable, as we noted, it is extremely capable and an extremely popular add-on - get this - having been forked on GitHub 7, times to create descendant projects of that base package which are widely spread throughout the industry, deployed on websites far and wide. So that means right now, once again, this is public, and all PHP-based sites which chose to use this jQuery file upload in its 7, variations are currently subject to any attacker uploading any file of their choosing, executable, and running it on that hosting server.

Since discovering this critical vulnerability, Larry's been busy. He's examined 1, out of the 7, forks of the plugin. Every one of them was also exploitable. Of course, because you just copy the code, yeah. And still worse, it turns out that at least some of the underground hacker community have been aware of this widespread backdoor for years.

As ZDNet explains in their coverage under the title "Zero-Day in popular jQuery plugin actively exploited for at least three years," they said: The plugin is the second most starred jQuery project on GitHub, after the jQuery framework itself.

It is immensely popular, has been forked over 7, times, and has been integrated into hundreds, if not thousands, of other projects, such as CMSes, CRMs, Intranet solutions, WordPress plugins, Drupal add-ons, Joomla components, and so on.

A vulnerability in this plugin would be devastating, as it could open gaping security holes in a lot of platforms installed in a lot of sensitive places. Earlier this year" - and as we know it was a few weeks ago - "Larry Cashdollar," they write, "a security researcher for Akamai's SIRT Security Intelligence Response Teamhas discovered a vulnerability in the plugin's source code that handles file uploads to PHP servers.

Cashdollar says that attackers can abuse this vulnerability to upload malicious files on servers such as backdoors and web shells. He said the vulnerability has been exploited in the wild. And apparently the vulnerability was one of the worst-kept secrets of the hacker scene and appears to have been actively exploited even before Larry found several YouTube videos containing tutorials on how one could exploit the jQuery File Upload plugin to take over servers.

So actually I'll note, I've mentioned this before, but it is for exactly this reason that my own forthcoming PHP-based - as I mentioned, I did go to v7. The SQRL public forums are hosted on that.

But they are running on their own physically separate and network-isolated machine that has no connection to any of the rest of GRC's network because there's just no way to trust a system like that. These sorts of things are going to happen. And while, yes, as long as somebody is wired into security events in the industry, you can keep up with things, I can't have code that I didn't write that was sourced from hundreds of different places in order to glue together a solution.

I can't have that on my network. I hope that anybody who is aware of what's going on, knows that they used a descendant of this jQuery File Upload, will recognize that the author had the best of intentions. He worked with Larry. Initially he could not duplicate what Larry was seeing because the author's PHP test server was not configured to ignore the. By default, as we know, for eight years, sinceApache has been.

So anyway, the author immediately put file type restrictions on last week's fix of this. But it needs to be fixed comprehensively. And we've talked before about the dangers of lapsed domains. Since domain ownership is valuable, we have systems in place to rigorously protect that ownership. As a consequence, over time, trust is created since domains are rarely successfully hijacked. But what about when a domain that's in use for some purpose is deliberately abandoned, and its name is allowed to lapse?

We've talked about the problems of overlapping security certificates in the past where somebody would have a certificate that was still valid for a domain that was reregistered.

Lapsing domains is something we see all the time since the Internet, as we know, is a constant churn with domains being abandoned and created. We sometimes find that a link we haven't visited in a long time now takes us to some weird search engine or a marketing page or something. Advertisers long ago figured that lapsed domains would see some traffic, some non-zero level of traffic. So they began snatching up any that lapsed to camp out their own nonsense there.

And in fact that happened to me. I used to - I referred in Podcast 44 to a domain that I had, grcmail. And if you go to grcmail. Some marketer grabbed that domain name when I allowed it to expire because I didn't want to keep paying for it every month, and I decided I wasn't ever going to use it. And now somebody's camped out there. But what happens when a supplier of active content, like in this case embedded web page scripting, decides to throw in the towel and no longer host something that they have been providing for years?

The Sucuri blog tells the story of that very nicely. I've paraphrased from what they wrote. They said when Twitter announced their new design for Tweet and Follow buttons back in October ofso just about exactly three years ago, marketers across the web developed a mild anxiety, Sucuri wrote. The new design came with a decision to nuke their beloved Tweet Count feature. Social signals can be a huge credibility indicator for visitors and site content.

So who doesn't think there's a psychological relationship between the number of social shares and the credibility of the content that's there? It's social validation, they write, plain and simple. Naturally, bloggers and website owners with an aversion to change started looking for alternative solutions that offered the same feature.

Marketers breathed a sigh of relief when easy-to-use services started popping up to offer Twitter share counts, and one specific one called "New Share Counts" quickly gained traction.

It even integrated with other existing social share plugins, they write, like SumoMe, AddThis, and Shareaholic. Setting up New Share Counts on a site was simple: Link your Twitter account and website, then add two lines of code to the bottom of every page you want to track shares from. So what happens is, naturally, any time a visitor pulls a page from a site that has decided to use New Share Counts, the script at the bottom of the page pulls nsc.

So this summer, after not quite three years, in July ofnewsharecounts. The service's original provider was about as responsible as one might hope. He posted a notice on his site referring visitors to opensharecount. So, however, Sucuri, they did some digging. They found that more then websites, more than websites did not get the message. They continued to embed the now discontinued script, which as I mentioned pulls a file, that file nsc.

Some very clever and nefarious hacker had apparently been waiting, like literally checking it daily, for just that to happen, since the next day they registered a new AWS S3 bucket under the same name and uploaded a malicious version of the nsc.

A bad guy grabbed it, much as someone would grab a domain name that had been abandoned, and hosted malicious script there under the same name, nsc. I've got a picture of it obfuscated in the show notes. The Sucuri guys decoded, decrypted this.

Instead, this snippet of code adds 10 fake browser history entries for the page that hosts it. An interesting feature of these history entries is that it prevents the user from choosing the previous page from the back button. When the user loads the page, a malicious event handler is added. This handler waits until the user taps the back button on their device or tries to navigate to a previous page.

It then fires an event, which causes the browser to open to the following destination. It's a scam page instead of taking them back to the previous page. Users on other devices won't notice anything suspicious, except for maybe the lack of Twitter share counts that would exist if the original New Share Count script actually functioned. Now they are instead maliciously redirecting all of their mobile users to this malicious traffic.

one piece episode 686 online dating

Loading third-party scripts and elements," they write, "on your website always opens up the risk of unwanted content being served on your site without consent, especially when they come from an expired or unmaintained service. He provided a lot of information, which was sort of too much, I mean, it was sort of a little bit superfluous. And I didn't have time to get it into shape.

But I did this time, and I didn't want it just to go unnoticed. He sent this on Saturday at 8: The tweet's subject or first line was "SpinRite giving a blast from the past. I've been a long-time listener to Security Now! I've been owning a copy of SpinRite for years and occasionally tried it on hard drives when one of my numerous RAID boxes would drop, and SpinRite would perform its magic. It had crashed and would no longer boot.

That allowed SpinRite to see the drive. Running a Level 2 SpinRite scan on the drive found and repaired two errors on the drive, one which the drive fixed on its own and one where SpinRite's Dynastat recovery kicked in to work at repairing the sector. And when I came back in the next morning, SpinRite showed me a green screen, stating that it had successfully completed all its tasks.

Just to be double sure, I reran the Level 2 scan, and SpinRite zipped through the drive in 90 minutes. Then I reinstalled the drive into its original server. Thanks for a terrific product and for letting me have my very own SpinRite story.

Chopper and Nami ask Robinwho had been attacked by Monet, if she is okay. Robin says that she is fine, and that the children need to be stopped. Chopper tells Nami to hurry, as the children are leaving and he had promised Mocha that he would protect her. Mocha tries to run, but the rest of the children pursue her, shouting for the candy.

She yells that Chopper told her what type of candy she has, and why they cannot be eaten. As she runs, she remembers meeting Sindwho said that they would be better within a year. She also remembers meeting Caesar Clownwho had told her that he had lost a son to a disease and did not want it to happen to anyone else. Caesar had then introduced her to UzuDoranand Konbuall of whom were nice to her.

Monet had given them candy and introduced them to more children, making Mocha realize that even her acting was a lie. The three are surprised, but Zoro then blocks Monet's attack aimed at Nami. Zoro berates his opponent for going after unarmed targets, but Nami creates a Heat Ball and strikes Monet's wing, inflicting damage. Nami turns to run, but Monet dives into the snow and creates a Snow Fence with her Devil Fruit powers.

Monet then uses snow to surround Nami, weakening her. Monet then appears as a snow monster and tries to attack Chopper, but Nami moves him out of the way. Robin forces Monet away with a Quatro Mano: Spankand Monet reforms, saying that the children are important test subjects she must protect. She continues, asking which one of them coerced the children into rebelling, to which Chopper responds by saying that they left by free will.

Zoro slashes a hole in the wall and orders them to leave, so Nami, Chopper, and Robin head out after the children. Monet tells Zoro that it is typical of pirates to steal the fruits of their labor before attacking Zoro with her wings.